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The Influence of Age and Experience On Aircraft Accident Rates

GENERAL: The operation of modern, high speed military sircraft taxes the ability of the pilot to the limit of human capabilities so that the slightest lapse in attention or temporary lowering of efficiency is more than likely to result in an accident. This fact has long been recognized and every effort has been made to achieve and maintain peak efficiency of flying personnel by rigorous selection, thorough training, and the best possible medical care by trained flight surgeons. The degree of selection of pilots is indicated by the following figures. Of 1000 men applying for aviation cadet training, about 40% are immediately disqualified by physical examinations and mental screening tests; of the remaining 600, about 70% are eliminated from pilot training at classification centers; of the 180 who enter pilot training, about 50% are eliminated during the course of training and only the remaining 90, or 9% of the original number, are graduated as rated pilots. There is probably no other professional group any where near as highly selected from among the best young men in the country. During their entire career as flyers they are under strict medical supervision. are temporarily suspended from flying for ailments which would be considered trivial in any other occupation, and are indefinitely suspended from flying at the first appearance of any physical, mental, emotional, or professional defects.

In spite of this selection, training, and care, the Office of Flying Safety reports that pilot error is either entirely responsible or a contributing factor in about two-thirds of all aircraft accidents. With the introduction of super high speed jet fighters and other high performance aircraft, there is every reason to believe that the human factor will



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increase in importance and the problem of "pilot error" will become even more acute. It is obvious that any measures which will reduce the number of accidents due to human failure are of prime importance to the Air Forces.

The purpose of this paper is to present data on the influence of age and experience on the aircraft accident rate, these being two human factors subject to administrative control.

It is believed that these data are relative to requests which have been made for information on the following subjects:

- (1) The determination of the optimal age for flyers and the number of years of service the Air Forces may expect to receive from a pilot once he is trained.
 - (2) The justification of flight pay.
- (3) Information for insurance compenies to aid them in setting life insurance rates for flying personnel.


SOURCES OF THE DATA

Two sets of data were required for this study:

- (1) The age and experience of the pilot of each aircraft 103ponsible for an accident during a specified eriod of time, the cause of the
 accident, and the plane type and model.
- of pilots in each age and experience group by plane type and model.

and the total hours flown in the MAF in the Continental U. S., excl. sive of the Flying Training Command, during the nine-wonth period, July '944 through Werch 1945.

The data on age covers all the accidents and the total hours flown in





the AAF in the Continental U. S., exclusive of the Flying Training Command, during the six month period October 1944 through March 1945.

The accident data were supplied by the Flying Safety Branch of Flight
Operations Division, AC/AS-3 in cooperation with the Office of the Air Surgeon
from Aircraft Accident Reports, AAF Form 14. Out of a total of 4638
accidents reported, 273 were omitted from this study because the age or
experience of the pilots were unknown. The experience of the pilot of
each plane responsible for an accident was obtained from Individual Flight
Records, AAF Form 5. The first pilot hours to data as of the end of the
month in which the accident occurred were used as a measure of pilot experience. It should be noted that this includes only first pilot time as a
rated pilot and does not include student pilot time.

The flying time data were obtained from Individual Flight Records, AAF

Form 5, in a study set up as a joint cooperative project by the Office of

the Air Surgeon, the Flying Safety Branch of Flight Operation Division,

AC,'AS-3 and the Office of Statistical Control. The data were obtained as

follows:

Each line entry on the individual flight record, AAF Form 5, represents one man day of flying in a particular plane type and model. A representative sample of 5% of all flying done in the Continental U. S. (exclusive of the Flying Training Command) was obtained by coding a card for every twentieth line entry on the Forms 5 for all pilots. The age of the pilot, the experience of the pilot (total first pilot hours to date as of the end of the month), the first pilot hours and co-pilot hours flown that day, the plane type and model, and the date were recorded on each card, The cards were then tabulated to obtain flying time by age and experience of the pilots for each plane type and model. Multiplying the hours derived from



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order to obtain a more accurate estimate, correcting for minor sampling errors, the sample totals for each age and experience group in each plane type and model were multiplied by the ratio towards the sample totals for each plane type and model and the total hours for the type and as all as derived from AAF Form 110. (These ratios were close to 20, though not exactly 20). As the sample for the entire nine month period was very large, covering 223,736 man days of flying, the flying time estimates are close to being exact and are certainly accurate enough for any practical purposes.

EXPERIENCE VS. ACCIDENT RATES

hours by pilot experience for all plane types, heavy bombers (N-17 and N-24), medium bombers (B-25 and B-26), light bombers (A-20 and A-26), all single engine fighters, and transports (C-45, C-46, C-47, C-53, and C-78). The pilots were divided into ten groups by experience for all plane types. The data for specific plane types were divided into just seven groups by pilot experience since the total flying hours was not sufficient to werrant a finer breakdown.

The accident rate for all plane types was 100,1 per 100,000 flying hours for pilots with less than 50 hours first pilot experience. "Ith increasing pilot experience, the rate dropped steadily down to a rate of only 25.7 for pilots with 1500 to 2000 hours experience. In other words, pilots with less than 50 hours experience have nearly 4 times the accident rate of pilots with 1500 to 2000 hours experience.

Pilots with over 2000 hours experience had an accident rate of 39 1





which is appreciably higher than the rate for pilots with 1500 to 2000 hours and about the same as for pilots with 500 to 750 hours experience.

The curve for heavy bombers is just about parallel to the curve for all plane types, showing almost the same relative drop in accident rates with increasing experience, although all the rates are much lower. The rate for pilots with less than 50 hours experience was 55.0 as compared with a rate of 16.0 for pilots with 1000 to 2000 hours experience. However, while the rate for pilots with over 2000 hours experience increases somewhat, this increase is small, the rate rising to only 19.0.

The single engine fighters showed the greatest relative drop in accident rates with increasing pilots experience (from 275.7 for pilots with under 50 hours experience to 67 4 for pilots with 500 to 1000 hours experience). But the accident rate then rose sharply with a further increase in pilot experience to 84.5 for pilots with 1000 to 2000 hours experience and 188 6 for pilots with over 2000 hours experience.

Light bombers showed the same general trends as single fighters, transports were similar to heavy bombers, and medium bombers fell in between

Table 2 and Figure 2 show the accident rates by pilots experience for several plane models, the P-38, P-40, P-47, B-24, B-25, etc. These curves show the same trends as previously shown for their plane type groups. These curves are not quite as smooth since they are based on a smaller total number of flying hours and accidents. The P-38 appears to have the greatest correlation between pilot experience and accident rates.

The accident rates for all plane types decrease rapidly with increasing pilot experience up to a certain point and then increase in pilots with a great deal of experience. In single enrine fighters, light hombers, and





medium bombers the lowest accident rates are for pilots with 500 to 1000 hours experience. In heavy bombers, and transports the lowest rates are for pilots with 1000 to 2000 hours experience

AGE VS. ACCIDENT RATES

The accident rates per 100,000 flying hours by age of pilots for all plane types, heavy bombers, and single enrine fighters are shown in Table 3 and Figure 3.

The accident rates for all plane types decrease rapidly from 129 3 for pilots under 22 years of age to 23 2 for pilots from 30 through 34 years of age. Pilots 35 years of age and older have a somewhat higher accident rate. In interpreting the slight increase in pilots 35 years old and over it should be noted that older pilots in staff positions tend to do their flying in safer plane types, so the rise with age is less when all plane types are considered separately.

In heavy bombers, the accident rates decrease very ranking from 60.4 for pilots under 22 years of age to only 5.9 for pilots from 50 through 34 years of age. After age 35, the accident rates increase up to 51.7 for pilots 40 years of age and older.

The accident rates in single engine fighters decrease from 171.4 for pilots under 22 years of age cown to 66 2 for pilots 24 and 25 years of age.

The rate decreases very slightly from 24 through 29 years of age and then begins to rise reaching a rate of 172.9 for pilots 40 years of age and older.

AGE AND EXPERIENCE

Since age and excertains are conversely the age factor and conversely the age trends were included by the age factor and conversely the age trends were included by



of pilots in the same age groups and plot accident transportations of pilots in the same experience groups. This can only a done for a instrume types since there are not many older pilots with little experience or joung pilots with a great deal of experience.

Table 4 and Figure 4 show for single engine figures the accident rate by experience for pilots under 22 years of age, pilots 23 and 24, pilots 24 and 25, and pilots 26 through 29. There were not shough pilots over 30 with little experience to plot reliable fronds for the older age groups. The accident rates for pilots under 22 years of age are all much higher than for pilots up to 29 years of age. In each age group, the accident rate decreases from a maximum for pilots with loss than 50 hours experience down to a minimum for pilote with 150 to 500 hours experience (500 to 1000 hours experience for the age group 24-25) and then increases again with increasing experience.

By comparing Figure 4 with Figure 1, in is most that the opportunity effect of experience on the accident rates is numbers were an experience is held constant. In other words, the combined offsets of a sand experience has the greatest influence on accident rates.

The influence of age on scolarst rates holding experience constant is shown by Table 4 and Figure 5. This is shown in Figure 4 for several experience groups of single engine fighters and heavy combers. The combined rates for all plane types are not shown since the fact that close priots tend to fly safer plane types obscures the trends unless specific plane types are studied separately.

In single engine fighter pilote with over 1000 hours experience, the accident rates fall rapidly with a serious see under 22 through one 30-34 and then rise in pilots of ages 35-39. In simple makes fighter pilots

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with from 150 to 500 hours experience, the accident rates increases topinning with age 30-34.

Comparing Figure 5 with Figure 4 and Figure 3 with Figure 1, it appears that age has a greater influence on the accident rate than experience, although both are very important. Possible resions for this will be discussed later.

PILOT ERROR

Each accident reported on AAF Form 14 is analyzed by the accident investigating board and by the Office of Flying Safety to determine the causes. This is obviously a very difficult task in purposes, particularly if the pilot is killed. For the purposes of this study, each accident has been classified according to whather. In the opinion of the analysts, pilot error was the only cause, pilot error and some other vause were involved, or whether no pilot error was involved.

pilot experience and Table 6 and Figure 7 show the accident rates for all plane types by age of pilot for all accidents, all accidents involving pilot error, accidents involving pilot error only, and accidents with no pilot error. In each of these two figures, it is seen that the four surves follow the same general trends: The accidents attributed to pilot error only have, as would be expected, the greatest correlation with both age and experience

The accidents in which no pilot error could be proven also show a high correlation with age and a simificent correlation with pilot experience. This is interpreted to mean that the ability of the pilot has an influence on the accident rate even in those accidents in which the fact cannot be definitely demonstrated by a study of individual equals. This does not mean that "pilot error", as strictly infined, is necessarily responsible RESTRICTED and The accidents in which the fact cannot be definitely demonstrated by a study of individual equals.



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for the accidents of ther factors may be involved, for example, round treatment of a plane over a long period of time may eventually cause material failure resulting in an accident although no yillot error is involved at the instant of the accident. On the other hand, a highly skilled pilot may become aware of minor material deficiencies and have them corrected before they become serious enough to have an accident.

In other words, this analysis suggests that the human element may be even more important in accidents than would be indicated by the report that pilot error is directly involved in two-thirds of all accidents

TYPES OF PILOT ERROR

Pilot error may be subdivided into the following six types: misuse of controls, violations, lack of proficiency, failure to observe, misjudged distance, and other pilot error. Since more than one type may be involved in a single accident, the total of the types, as shown in Tables 7 and 8, is greater than the total number of pilot error exists:

pique 8 shows accident rate of all land greatly pilot extrins and Figure 9 shows accident rate to see for each of these slatings of pilot error. All six types are corrulated its both tilo, experience and age. Misuse of controls is the more section type of pilot error.

Lack of proficiency is the northal high correlated with pilot experience and decreases rapidly as experience increases. Violations are the most highly correlated with are increasing rapidly through are 34 and then increasing again in the older age groups

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It has been shown that there are not been all the core leged





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with/pilot experience and age. The difference is recident rates between various age and experience groups in the same type of aircraft is far greater than the difference between accident rates of different models of the same type and almost as great as the differences between the several aircraft types.

A biological interpretation of these trands is interesting, though perhaps of little administrative significance. One might surmise that the very high accident rates of young pilots, particularly those under 22 years old, is due to recklessness and a lack of realization of danger— ith more maturity the pilots become more conservative and the sculdent rates go down. The increasing accident rates in the older size may be interpreted in terms of the degeneration of psychometer and sensory resonates with increasing age and to the development of a montal state of musicly and apprehension perhaps induced or secultuated by the strain of flater. The increased accident rates in young flyers with he look fours counting is the account for. Perhaps it may be martly extrained to the development of a montal state of source confidence of young pilots with a look of examples.

The high accident rates among very experienced place and in the client age groups are probably due in part to resent administrative pulletee. In general, the older and more experienced pilote are of higher and then the younger and less experienced men. Above a certain least of one and experience a very large proportion of pilots are assigned to such detailed the duties and only accomplish the tara minister of rows and as always switch required by regulations. Thus, while the interest I lying hours may be high, they have had little rocent experience and are upon the newer plane types. Corbined with the first of the second contact of pilots, they are given a freedom from a small star and the newer plane types. Corbined with the second stars are small to the second of the second pilots, they are given a freedom from a small star and the second stars are given a freedom from a small star and the second stars are given a freedom from a small star and the second stars are given a freedom from a small star and the second stars are given a freedom from a small star and the second stars are given a freedom from a small star and the second stars are given a freedom from a small star and the second stars are given a freedom from a small star and the second stars are given as freedom from a small star and the second stars are given a freedom from a small star and the small stars are given as freedom from a small star and the small stars are given as freedom from a small star and the small stars are given as freedom from a small star and the small stars are given as freedom from a small star and the small stars are given as freedom from a small star and the small stars are given as freedom from a small star and the small stars are given as freedom from a small star and the small stars are given as freedom from a small star and the small stars are given as freedom from a small star and the small stars are given as freedom from a small star and the small stars are given as freedom from a small star and the small stars are giv





is out of proportion to their current proficiency. It is doubtful whether efficiency can be maintained in any complex manipulative task with so little practice.

Judging from accident rates alone, it would appear to be unwise to give pilot ratings to very young men. A lower age limit of about 22 would seem to be indicated for fighter rilots and perhaps as high as 24 for heavy bomber pilots. On the same basis, it appears that fighter pilots should not be much over 30 years old and that heavy bomber pilots should not be much over 35. A study of combat records by age might lead to semewhat different conclusions.

This would seem to indicate that after training a pilot, the fir Forces can only expect to use him efficiently for about ten years assigned to primary duty as a first pilot.

This period of active pilot duty might perhaps be extended in two ways a careful study might reveal that with increased discipline and supervision the accident rate of young pilots could be reduced. This is suggested, for example, by the high inverse correlation of violations and age. Perhaps a longer period of supervised flying before awarding a pilot's rating would have the desired results.

Con the other hand, it seems likely that pilots would retain high efficiency to an older age if they were never removed for long from primary duty as first pilots if they were ever to be reassigned to such duty. A study similar to this should be made to determine the minimum first pilot hours per month which would be required to maintain peak efficiency espectially in older men. This might lead to a regulation requiring considerably more than the present minimum of four hours per month flying up to a grade or age limit after which a pilot would no longer be eligible for assignment to primary duty as first pilot.

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It is suggested that research studies of the human factors in flying, particularly in respect of the effect of training and operational policies and pilot selection methods, would be of great value in lowering the accident rate and increasing efficiency.

Prepared By:

Statistics Branch
Office of The Air Surgeon
12 December 1945





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TABLE 1 ACCIDENT RATES FER 100,000 FLYING HOURS RY FXFERIANCE OF PILOT TOTAL AAF, Continental U. S. Exclusive of the Flying Training Command NINE MONTH PERIOD - JULY 1944 - MARCH 1945

(a) ALL PLANE TYPES

Total	JOEG SCOOL	1500-1999	2677-700T	750-399	672-275	252-499	150-249	100-149	50 - 99	Under 50	Sours To Date	Experience of Milot
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4366 53 6	66 39 1	25.7	28.9	34.6	38,6	X	8	67 3	£2 **	1.000 021	Rate	All





SECURITY INFORMATION TABLE 1 ACCIDENT RATES PER 100,000 PLYING HOURS BY EXPERIENCE OF PILOT UNITY THE TOTAL AAF, Continental U.S. Exclusive of the Flying Training Command UNITY THE TOTAL SAFETY MARCH 1945

(B) BY PLANE TYPE

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	-4	220	(e)		N	20	٩	N.	i-CC	(A 20 M A 26)
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Accident Rates Per 100,000 Flying Hours by Experience of Pilot Total AAF, Continental U.S. Exclusive of The Flying Training Commend Mine Month Period - July 1944 - Narch 1945

Total	200060 Vez	1000-19 99	500-999	150-499	64T-00T	50-99	Under 50	EUPBRIENCE OF PILOT (FIRST PILOT HOURS TO DATE)		EXPERIENCE OF PILOT	
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298	#	33	43	S	56	99	33	Cris	AOE	7	
24.5	17.5	19.0	15.9	27.2	29.8	34.6	45 0	RATE	ACCICENTS		
24.5 1. 140.29 365	13910	187486	215805	188160	188256	236317	110358		FLYIND	55	
365	14	25	64	2	52	95	8	NO.	ACC	B-24	
32 0	9,19	13.3	22.7	34,0	2	5.01	61.6	RATE	ACCIDENTS		
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37.0	94.2	17.9	15.6	45	45.5	58 0	91 0	FATE	ACCIDENTS		
71 37.0 300.338 334 111.2	2333	18966	82585	85351	15461	33202	2436		FLYING	P-38	
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Table 2 (continued)

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701	2000dover	1000-1999	500-999	150-499	100-149	50 - 99	Under 50	Carlet I	Hours To	EXPERIENCE OF PILOT
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MAN A	E	12	90	191	3	154	86	No	1304	0
01 4	55 2	3	4 65	73.5	111 041	154 141 2	38 215.0	RATE	ACC IDENTS	
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Table 3

Total AAF, Continental U.S. Exclusive of The Flying Training Command Accident Rates Per 100,000 Flying Hours by Age of Pilot Six Wonth Period - October 1944 - March 1945

	All Plane Tynes	· 57	708	Repry Bombers	ombez	50	Single Engine	Eng	ne
20	PLYING	ACC I DENTE	ENTS	FLYING	ACC IDENTS	EN78	FLYING	ACCIDENTS	SUNTE
Files	House	NO	PATE	Hours	No.	RATE	RMON	No.	RATE
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22 - 23	1103317	699	63.4	353467	138	39.0	368513	707	83.3
24 - 25	1310508 503	203	28	395036	00	20 5	290227	563	8
12 - 98	1024924 352	352	34.3	401,62	57	29 2	176544	117	66.3
28 - 29	641039 193	193	30 2	191332	3	15 /	97692	5	62.4
30 - 34	3/1236	CA CA	23.2	6//90	7.	5.9	40508	28	69 0
35 - 39	93320	3	31.5	10995	Po	18.2	6576	OR.	121.7
read & On	70183	19	27.1	9459	w	31.7	1157	R)	172.9
Potato	745:308	10 m	0. 6a	208727 5 64 6 645 2450 204	418	200 .20	1165675 1031 88-4	1031	28

of time than the tables by Experience of Filst (tables 1, 2, etc.). of tables. The total rates are therefore somewhat different on the two sets



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TABLE 4. ACCIDENT RATES PER 100,000 FLYING HOURS BY AGE AND EXPERIENCE OF PILOT Total AAF, Continental U.S. Exclusive of the Flying Training Comment SIX WONTH PERIOD .. OCTOBER 1944 - MARCH 1945

(a) Single Engine Fighters


35 35 35	30 - 34	26 - 29	24 - 25	22 - 23	Under 22	(b) Beavy	35 - 39	30 - 34	26 - 29	24 - 25	22 - 23	Under 22	PILOT			402
9	735	19975	22613	42597	26953	Bombers	160	565	3107	3469	8765	6751	HOURS	PLYING	Under	
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0	0	24	13	35	100		2	On	rea.	8	140	133	No.	ACC	- h99	0 0000
1	1	20.7	12.2	4,54	63.2		127.1	102.9	62.5	63.2	77.0	155.1	RATE	ACCIDENT'S	9	0 0 0 0 0 0
2453	22822	139536	106365	36114	1816		572	15604	112668	107907	17,424	4009	HOURS	FLYING	500	
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50	4.4	13.6	Log on	W. 3	165.2			T. 49	62.1	52.8	94.2	299.3	RATE	ACCIDENTS	9	
7556	30774	118496	24418	9534	686		3153	TSHON	48898	21541	71.72	655	HOURS	PLYING	1000 and Over	
pul	w	5	12	2	0		5	00	J.	S	9	N	NO.	A00 10	0 0 D	
13.2	9 7	12.7	22.1	21.0	1		158.6	92	3	116.1	125.5	305.3	RATE	ACC IDENTS	7	

FOTE: Since for young pilots have much experience and for older pilots have little experience, the flying have not such weight should be viloued to the some of the boxes of this table. In interpreting the



TABLE 5. ACCIDENT RATES PER 100,000 PLYING HOURS BY EXPERIENCE OF PILOT Total Ad. Continental U.S. Exclusive of the Flying Training Command HIME MONTH PERIOD July 1944 - Merch 1945

Total	2000&over	1500-1999	1000-1499	750-999	500-749	250 499	150-249	100-149	50 - 99	Under 50		Carvo Carvo	(FIRST PILOT	ENHANTENCE
777777	168841	361942	989815	867311	1185328	1220229	897766	976343	10544 36	425766	evine	PLYING	TO' AL, ALL	
998h	66	93	286	300	אייש	25	241	662	0% 0% 0%	25.	K	MCCIDE.NT3	ACCIDE MES	
53.6	39.1	25.7	28,9	34.6	36	52.0	8	67.8	84.2	1.001	THANK	SIN	NT3	
2686	3	342	8	155	273	\mathcal{S} \tag{8}	345	h2h	592	278	8	ACC	94714	C
33.0	17.2	11.6	16.2	17.9	23	31.8	38 4	4	56.1	65 3	RATE	ACCIDENTS	PILIPERIOR SALES	ACCIDENT
1197	9	12	59	56	106	150	185	197	91.8	10.	3	ACC	the same of the last	
14.7	5-3	الما الما	6.0	6.5	C4 9	25.6	200	20.28	26.2	23	Tires	ACCION NIS	SHOR NOTES	
1493	33.	50	117	135	177	227	17.	515	262	115	8	ACCI	NO PIL	
18. 3 187	18,4	13.8	11.8	15.6	17 17 五	09	19.3	21.7	54.8	21 0	PATE	ACC DENTS	NO PILOT ERROR	
187	5	صو	9	10	7	Co 3-0	23	26	34	33	3	ACC	UNDETE	
N)	3.5	0	0.9	2	p = 0	fro C	כח	<i>n</i>	CH No	7 %	F. W.	ACCHUENTS	CAUSE	





Total AAF, Continental U.S. Exclusive of the Flying Training Commend TABLE 6. ACCIPAT SAPES FER 100 000 PLTING HOURS BY ASE OF PILOT SIX MONTH PERIOD - October 1944 - March 1945

	-	5	100	3		1563	; C	9.	1080 July 1080	Fotal
	10.0		-)		14 0	10	27.7	19	70183	DORG VOT
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	F	51.	90	. 03	3	575	34.3	352	1024924	j ,
) 28 (c)	10.2	4	23.0	301	38.2	×0,4	1310508	*)
	5	200	2)		4) 0	45	72	639	11011	52 33
	· ·	}-^	,	0.0	300	Š	101		٢,0120	Un. 97 22
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	130	ACC10/18	S.M.	BAN 3Ct OCY	MICHOENIS	The same	ACCIDENT'S	Accin	A VIND	LIOT
CAUSE UNOFTERM NCD	1	PRECY ERROR	PILOT LANCE	ON S CAUDE	AT VCCIDENLA	S MO		ACC 1DE	TOTAL, ALI ACCIDENTS	AGE
}			DENT	ACCIDENT	CAUSE OF	CA				

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Acadent Rates Per 100,000 Flying Hours by Experience of Filet and by Types of Filet Error Total AAF, Continental U.S. Exclusive of the Flying Training Command
Nine Month Period - July 1944 - Narch 1945

TATOT	2000&over	1999-1999	500-399	150-199	64T 001	95	Linder 50	DATE	HOLKS TO	EXPERIENCE
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814111111111111111111111111111111111111	168841	1351757	2052539 428	2117995 133	976343 424	2054436 592	125 100 56K	MOURS	FLYIND	"MYOLVING PULL LARGE
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330	17 2	149	20 9	34.5	1.00	55	5	RANK	PLIN 301 30Y	RROX
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7.4	6.5	5.0	5 5	OR (A)	OR PL	9.7	12 7	RATE	ACCIDENT8	EAROR

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TABLE 8. ACCIDENT RATES PER 100,000 FLYING HOURS BY AGE OF PILOT AND BY TYPE OF PILOT ERROR Total AAF, Continental U. S. Exclusive of the Flying Training Command SIX MONTH PERIOD - OCTOBER 1944 - MARCH 1945


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ALL ACCIDENTS	FLYING FLYING	-	02107年	1103317	1310508	1024924	641039	371236	93320	70183	5054647 1563 30 2 1056
ALL ACCIDENTS	ACCIDENTS	No	50h	45.2	,50°	53	116	8	50°	10	1563
RROR	ENTS	KATE	1.38	ù1.0	23.0	20	90	13 5	18 2	14 2	5
CONTROLS	-CC IDENTS	No.	R. L. C.	396	226	144	2.5	33	10	£.	5301
30	SING	KATE	58.9	26 8	17.2	24.0	305	20	10 /	19	33
VIOLATIONS	ACC IDENTS	NO	Ite	#	33	9	0 2	2	p.d	p	1,71
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PROFI	ACCIDENTS	CN	70	18	5	52	2	13	دمين	>	- N
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WE TO	BLN	PATE	16 4	C9 .	3.9	4 0	(M)	1 9	~	14 5	\n^2
DI STANCE	ACCIDENTS	NO	26	Ci.	0.7.	٥	01	Ų.	> -0	2	46
DISTANCE	ENTS	RATE	5.5	3.1	0	0 9	1.6	0 .8	<u>-</u>	1.4	1.8
CHARR PILOT	ACC IDENTS	No	86	115	70	65	2	17	6	N	140%
PILOT	EM3	RATE	18.3	10.4	5.3	6 3	6.6	5 .	6.4	₹ 28	79

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